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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w23742
来源IDWorking Paper 23742
Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets
Kate Ho; Robin S. Lee
发表日期2017-08-28
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, Nash-in-Nash with Threat of Replacement, that captures insurers' incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer-optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals.
主题Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23742
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581415
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GB/T 7714
Kate Ho,Robin S. Lee. Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets. 2017.
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