全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23742
来源ID	Working Paper 23742
	Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets
	Kate Ho; Robin S. Lee
发表日期	2017-08-28
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, Nash-in-Nash with Threat of Replacement, that captures insurers' incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer-optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23742
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581415
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Kate Ho,Robin S. Lee. Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets. 2017.