| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23747 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23747 |
| Bail-ins and Bail-outs: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability | |
| Benjamin Bernard; Agostino Capponi; Joseph E. Stiglitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-04 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper endogenizes intervention in financial crises as the strategic negotiation between a regulator and creditors of distressed banks. Incentives for banks to contribute to a voluntary bail-in arise from their exposure to financial contagion. In equilibrium, a bail-in is possible only if the regulator’s threat to not bail out insolvent banks is credible. Contrary to models without intervention or with government bailouts only, sparse networks enhance welfare for two main reasons: they improve the credibility of the regulator’s no-bailout threat for large shocks and they reduce free-riding incentives among bail-in contributors when the threat is credible. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23747 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581421 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin Bernard,Agostino Capponi,Joseph E. Stiglitz. Bail-ins and Bail-outs: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23747.pdf（889KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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