| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23771 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23771 |
| Strategy-proofness in the Large | |
| Eduardo M. Azevedo; Eric Budish | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-11 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for market design. Conceptually, SP-L requires that an agent who regards a mechanism’s “prices” as exogenous to her report – be they traditional prices as in an auction mechanism, or price-like statistics in an assignment or matching mechanism – has a dominant strategy to report truthfully. Mathematically, SP-L weakens SP in two ways: (i) truth-telling is required to be approximately optimal (within epsilon in a large enough market) rather than exactly optimal, and (ii) incentive compatibility is evaluated ex interim, with respect to all full-support i.i.d. probability distributions of play, rather than ex post with respect to all possible realizations of play. This places SP-L in between the traditional notion of approximate strategy-proofness, which evaluates incentives to manipulate ex post, and the traditional notion of approximate Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility, which evaluates incentives to manipulate ex interim with respect to the single common-knowledge probability distribution associated with Bayes-Nash equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23771 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo M. Azevedo,Eric Budish. Strategy-proofness in the Large. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23771.pdf（876KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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