G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w23817
来源IDWorking Paper 23817
Signaling to Experts
Pablo Kurlat; Florian Scheuer
发表日期2017-09-18
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We study competitive equilibrium in a signaling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic Spence (1973) model of job market signaling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in addition to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e. their expertise. In equilibrium, some high type workers forgo signaling and are hired by better informed firms, who make positive profits. Workers’ education decisions and firms’ use of their expertise are strategic complements, allowing for multiple equilibria. We characterize wage dispersion and the extent of signaling as a function of the distribution of expertise among firms. The market can create insufficient or excessive incentives for firms to acquire information, and we provide a formula to measure this inefficiency. Our model can also be applied to a variety of other signaling problems, including securitization, corporate financial structure, insurance markets, or dividend policy.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23817
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581491
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Pablo Kurlat,Florian Scheuer. Signaling to Experts. 2017.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w23817.pdf(885KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Pablo Kurlat]的文章
[Florian Scheuer]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Pablo Kurlat]的文章
[Florian Scheuer]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Pablo Kurlat]的文章
[Florian Scheuer]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w23817.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。