| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23869 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23869 |
| Bankruptcy and the Cost of Organized Labor: Evidence from Union Elections | |
| Murillo Campello; Janet Gao; Jiaping Qiu; Yue Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-02 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Unionized workers are entitled to special treatment in bankruptcy court. This can be detrimental to other corporate stakeholders in default states, with unsecured creditors standing to lose the most. Using data on union elections covering several decades, we employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of worker unionization on bondholders in bankruptcy states. Closely won union elections lead to significant bond value losses, especially when firms approach bankruptcy, have underfunded pension plans, and operate in non-RTW law states. Unionization is associated with longer, more convoluted, and costlier bankruptcy court proceedings. Unions further depress bondholders' recovery values as they are assigned seats on unsecured creditors' committees. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Relations |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23869 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581542 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Murillo Campello,Janet Gao,Jiaping Qiu,et al. Bankruptcy and the Cost of Organized Labor: Evidence from Union Elections. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23869.pdf（888KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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