| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w23876
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 23876
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| Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies |
| Michael Geruso; Timothy Layton
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| 发表日期 | 2017-10-02
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In this essay, we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates. We begin by outlining some important but often misunderstood differences between two types of conceptual frameworks related to selection. The first, which we call the fixed contracts approach, takes insurance contract provisions as given and views selection as influencing only insurance prices in equilibrium. The second, the endogenous contracts approach, treats selection as also influencing the design of the contract itself, including the overall level of coverage and coverage for services that are differentially demanded by sicker consumers. After outlining the selection problems, we discuss four commonly employed policy instruments that affect the extent and impact of selection: 1) premium rating regulation, including community rating; 2) consumer subsidies or penalties to influence the take-up of insurance; 3) risk adjustment; and 4) contract regulation. We discuss these policies with reference to two markets that seem especially likely to be targets of reform in the short and medium term: Medicare Advantage and the individual insurance markets reformed by the Affordable Care Act of 2010. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
; Public Goods
; Health, Education, and Welfare
; Health
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23876
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581548
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Michael Geruso,Timothy Layton. Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies. 2017.
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文件名：
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w23876.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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