全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23919
来源ID	Working Paper 23919
	Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement
	Marina Halac; Pierre Yared
发表日期	2017-10-09
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we characterize rules that are self-enforcing: the government must prefer to comply with the rule rather than face the punishment that follows a breach, where any such punishment must also be self-enforcing. We show that the optimal rule is a maximally enforced deficit limit, which, if violated, leads to the worst punishment for the government. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the government to violate the deficit limit following sufficiently high shocks. Punishment takes the form of a maximally enforced surplus limit that incentivizes overspending; fiscal discipline is restored when the government respects it.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Other ; Economic Systems
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23919
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581592
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement. 2017.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w23919.pdf（883KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览