| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23942 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23942 |
| Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments | |
| Alessandro Dovis; Rishabh Kirpalani | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Expectations of transfers by central governments incentivize overborrowing by local governments. In this paper, we ask if fiscal rules can reduce overborrowing if central governments cannot commit. We study a model in which the central government’s type is unknown and show that fiscal rules increase overborrowing if the central government’s reputation is low. In contrast, fiscal rules are effective in lowering debt if the central government’s reputation is high. Even when the central government’s reputation is low, binding fiscal rules will arise in the equilibrium of a signaling game. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23942 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581615 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Dovis,Rishabh Kirpalani. Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23942.pdf（467KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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