| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w23944
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 23944
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| Democracy by mistake |
| Daniel Treisman
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| 发表日期 | 2017-10-23
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | How does democracy emerge from authoritarian rule? Influential theories contend that incumbents deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to provide public goods, outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence. Examining the history of all democratizations since 1800, I show that such deliberate choice arguments may help explain up to one third of cases. In about two thirds, democratization occurred not because incumbent elites chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that get out of hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control. |
| 主题 | Other
; Law and Economics
; History
; Financial History
; Economic Systems
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23944
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581617
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Daniel Treisman. Democracy by mistake. 2017.
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文件名：
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w23944.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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