| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23962 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23962 |
| Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions | |
| Francesco Decarolis; Maris Goldmanis; Antonio Penta | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-30 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the VCG mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23962 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581636 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Decarolis,Maris Goldmanis,Antonio Penta. Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23962.pdf（532KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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