| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23981 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23981 |
| Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns | |
| Sergey Chernenko; Josh Lerner; Yao Zeng | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-30 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using novel contract-level data, we study the recent trend in open-end mutual funds investing in unicorns—highly valued, privately held start-ups—and the consequences of these investments for corporate governance provisions. Larger funds and those with more stable funding are more likely to invest in unicorns. Compared to venture capital groups (VCs), mutual funds have weaker cash flow rights and are less involved in terms of corporate governance, being particularly underrepresented on boards of directors. Having to carefully manage their own liquidity pushes mutual funds to require stronger redemption rights, suggesting contractual choices consistent with mutual funds’ short-term capital sources. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23981 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581655 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sergey Chernenko,Josh Lerner,Yao Zeng. Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23981.pdf（467KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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