| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w23984
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 23984
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| Financial Crises, Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies |
| Luigi Bocola; Guido Lorenzoni
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| 发表日期 | 2017-11-06
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Foreign currency borrowing is perceived as a source of financial instability in emerging markets. We propose a theory where liability dollarization arises from an insurance motive of domestic savers. Because financial crises are associated with currency depreciations, savers are reluctant to hold assets denominated in local currency. This behavior makes local currency debt expensive, incentivizing borrowers to issue foreign currency debt. We show that this mechanism can generate multiple equilibria, with the bad equilibrium characterized by dollarization and financial instability. A domestic lender of last resort can eliminate the bad equilibrium, but interventions need to be fiscally credible. Holdings of foreign currency reserves hedge the fiscal position of the government and enhance its credibility, thus improving financial stability. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Money and Interest Rates
; International Economics
; International Finance
; International Macroeconomics
; Financial Economics
; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing
; Financial Markets
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23984
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581659
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Luigi Bocola,Guido Lorenzoni. Financial Crises, Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies. 2017.
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文件名：
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w23984.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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