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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w23999
来源IDWorking Paper 23999
CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility
Stefan Avdjiev; Bilyana Bogdanova; Patrick Bolton; Wei Jiang; Anastasia Kartasheva
发表日期2017-11-13
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要The promise of contingent convertible capital securities (CoCos) as a “bail-in” solution has been the subject of considerable theoretical analysis and debate, but little is known about their effects in practice. In this paper, we undertake the first comprehensive empirical analysis of bank CoCo issues, a market segment that comprises over 730 instruments totaling $521 billion. Four main findings emerge: 1) The propensity to issue a CoCo is higher for larger and better-capitalized banks; 2) CoCo issues result in statistically significant declines in issuers’ CDS spreads, indicating that they generate risk-reduction benefits and lower costs of debt. This is especially true for CoCos that: i) convert into equity, ii) have mechanical triggers, iii) are classified as Additional Tier 1 instruments; 3) CoCos with only discretionary triggers do not have a significant impact on CDS spreads; 4) CoCo issues have no statistically significant impact on stock prices, except for principal write-down CoCos with a high trigger level, which have a positive effect.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23999
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581676
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GB/T 7714
Stefan Avdjiev,Bilyana Bogdanova,Patrick Bolton,et al. CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility. 2017.
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