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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w24018 |
来源ID | Working Paper 24018 |
On the Economics of Audit Partner Tenure and Rotation: Evidence from PCAOB Data | |
Brandon Gipper; Luzi Hail; Christian Leuz | |
发表日期 | 2017-11-13 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper provides the first partner tenure and rotation analysis for a large cross-section of U.S. publicly listed firms over an extended period. We analyze the effects on audit quality as well as economic tradeoffs related to partner tenure and rotation with respect to audit hours and fees. On average, we find no evidence for audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for fresh-look benefits after rotations. Nevertheless, partner rotations have significant economic consequences. We find increases in audit fees and decreases in audit hours over the tenure cycle, which differ by partner experience, client size, and competitiveness of the local audit market. More generally, our findings are consistent with efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations. We also analyze special circumstances, such as audit firm switches and early partner rotations, and show that they are more disruptive than mandatory rotations, and also more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Unemployment and Immigration ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24018 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581692 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brandon Gipper,Luzi Hail,Christian Leuz. On the Economics of Audit Partner Tenure and Rotation: Evidence from PCAOB Data. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w24018.pdf(457KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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