G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w24050
来源IDWorking Paper 24050
Moral Hazard Misconceptions: the Case of the Greenspan Put
Gideon Bornstein; Guido Lorenzoni
发表日期2017-11-27
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要Policy discussions on financial market regulation tend to assume that whenever a corrective policy is used ex post to ameliorate the effects of a crisis, there are negative side effects in terms of moral hazard ex ante. This paper shows that this is not a general theoretical prediction, focusing on the case of monetary policy interventions ex post. In particular, we show that if the central bank does not intervene by monetary easing following a crisis, this creates an aggregate demand externality that makes borrowing ex ante inefficient. If instead the central bank follows the optimal discretionary policy and intervenes to stabilize asset prices and real activity, we show examples in which the aggregate demand externality disappears, reducing the need for ex ante intervention.
主题Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w24050
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581724
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gideon Bornstein,Guido Lorenzoni. Moral Hazard Misconceptions: the Case of the Greenspan Put. 2017.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w24050.pdf(310KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Gideon Bornstein]的文章
[Guido Lorenzoni]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Gideon Bornstein]的文章
[Guido Lorenzoni]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Gideon Bornstein]的文章
[Guido Lorenzoni]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w24050.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。