| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24050 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24050 |
| Moral Hazard Misconceptions: the Case of the Greenspan Put | |
| Gideon Bornstein; Guido Lorenzoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-27 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Policy discussions on financial market regulation tend to assume that whenever a corrective policy is used ex post to ameliorate the effects of a crisis, there are negative side effects in terms of moral hazard ex ante. This paper shows that this is not a general theoretical prediction, focusing on the case of monetary policy interventions ex post. In particular, we show that if the central bank does not intervene by monetary easing following a crisis, this creates an aggregate demand externality that makes borrowing ex ante inefficient. If instead the central bank follows the optimal discretionary policy and intervenes to stabilize asset prices and real activity, we show examples in which the aggregate demand externality disappears, reducing the need for ex ante intervention. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24050 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581724 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gideon Bornstein,Guido Lorenzoni. Moral Hazard Misconceptions: the Case of the Greenspan Put. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24050.pdf（310KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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