| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24064 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24064 |
| Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives | |
| Jongsub Lee; Junho Oh; David Yermack | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-04 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to greater CEO diversion of assets as perquisites. We further show that boards can use compensation awards that increase managerial performance incentives (delta) and risk-taking incentives (vega) in order to mitigate these two agency problems, with increases in managerial vega being particularly useful to alleviate the strategic default-related agency problem. We study equity compensation awards to CEOs of S&P 1500 companies during 2001–2015 and find that they occur in patterns consistent with these predictions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24064 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581738 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jongsub Lee,Junho Oh,David Yermack. Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24064.pdf（475KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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