| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24123 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24123 |
| Taxes and Turnout | |
| Felix Bierbrauer; Aleh Tsyvinski; Nicolas D. Werquin | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-18 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties face a trade-off between maximizing their base and getting their supporters out to vote. We study the implications of this framework for non-linear income taxation. In equilibrium, both parties propose the same tax policy. This equilibrium policy is a weighted combination of two terms, one reflecting the parties’ payoff from mobilizing their own supporters, one reflecting the payoff from demobilizing the supporters of the other party. The key determinant of the equilibrium policy is the distribution of the voters’ party attachments rather than their propensity to swing vote. Our analysis also provides a novel explanation for why even left-leaning parties may not propose high taxes on the rich. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24123 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581796 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Felix Bierbrauer,Aleh Tsyvinski,Nicolas D. Werquin. Taxes and Turnout. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24123.pdf（729KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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