| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24129 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24129 |
| How do insurance firms respond to financial risk sharing regulations? Evidence from the Affordable Care Act | |
| Daniel W. Sacks; Khoa Vu; Tsan-Yao Huang; Pinar Karaca-Mandic | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-18 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the effect of the Risk Corridors (RC) program on premiums and insurer participation in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s Health Insurance Marketplaces. The RC program, which was defunded ahead of coverage year 2016, and ended in 2017, is a risk sharing mechanism: it makes payments to insurers whose costs are high relative to their revenue, and collects payments from insurers whose costs are relatively low. We show theoretically that the RC program creates strong incentives to lower premiums for some insurers. Empirically, we find that insurers who claimed RC payments in 2015, before defunding, had greater premium increases in 2017, after the program ended. Insurance markets in which more insurers made RC claims experienced larger premium increases after the program ended, reflecting equilibrium effects. We do not find any evidence that insurers with larger RC claims in 2015 were less likely to participate in the ACA Marketplaces in 2016 and 2017. Overall we find that the end of the RC program significantly contributed to premium growth. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24129 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581802 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel W. Sacks,Khoa Vu,Tsan-Yao Huang,et al. How do insurance firms respond to financial risk sharing regulations? Evidence from the Affordable Care Act. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24129.pdf（456KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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