| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24171 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24171 |
| Intermediation as Rent Extraction | |
| Maryam Farboodi; Gregor Jarosch; Guido Menzio | |
| 发表日期 | 2018 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a theory of intermediation as rent extraction, and explore its implications for the extent of intermediation, welfare and policy. A frictional asset market is populated by agents who are heterogeneous with respect to their bargaining skills, as some can commit to take-it-or-leave-it offers and others cannot. In equilibrium, agents with commitment power act as intermediaries and those without act as final users. Agents with commitment trade on behalf of agents without commitment to extract more rents from third parties. If agents can invest in a commitment technology, there are multiple equilibria differing in the fraction of intermediaries. Equilibria with more intermediaries have lower welfare and any equilibrium with intermediation is inefficient. Intermediation grows as trading frictions become small and during times when interest rates are low. A simple transaction tax can restore efficiency by eliminating any scope for bargaining. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24171 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581845 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maryam Farboodi,Gregor Jarosch,Guido Menzio. Intermediation as Rent Extraction. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24171.pdf（609KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
