| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24194 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24194 |
| Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability | |
| Jessica Leight; Dana Foarta; Rohini Pande; Laura Ralston | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-15 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Community targeting of vote payments — defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections — is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion. |
| 主题 | Development and Growth ; Development ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24194 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581868 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jessica Leight,Dana Foarta,Rohini Pande,et al. Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24194.pdf（477KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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