| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24201 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24201 |
| Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes | |
| Francesco Decarolis; Leonardo M. Giuffrida; Elisabetta Iossa; Vincenzo Mollisi; Giancarlo Spagnolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-15 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24201 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581875 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Decarolis,Leonardo M. Giuffrida,Elisabetta Iossa,et al. Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24201.pdf（779KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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