| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24251 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24251 |
| N-S Trade with Weak Institutions | |
| James E. Anderson | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-29 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | States with weak institutions (South) can lose from institutional response to trade with North. A Ricardian model of trade subject to predation characterizes the case. South labor earns equal returns in production and predation. Institutions are needed for security improvement because equilibrium predation is invariant to globalization and productivity rises, contrary to casual intuition. Enforcement reduces predation with terms of trade effects that typically imply opposing North-South interests. Trade also incentivizes institutional regime change to counter or control predation. North para-state institutions gain by promoting corrupt South institutions – Mafias or their state equivalents – over welfarist South states. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24251 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581925 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James E. Anderson. N-S Trade with Weak Institutions. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24251.pdf（381KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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