全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Saving and Dissaving with Hyperbolic Discounting

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24257
来源ID	Working Paper 24257
	Saving and Dissaving with Hyperbolic Discounting
	Dan Cao; Iván Werning
发表日期	2018-01-29
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Is the standard hyperbolic-discounting model capable of robust qualitative predictions for savings behavior? Despite results suggesting a negative answer, we provide a positive one. We give conditions under which all Markov equilibria display either saving at all wealth levels or dissaving at all wealth levels. Moreover, saving versus dissaving is determined by a simple condition comparing the interest rate to a threshold made up of impatience parameters only. Our robustness results illustrate a well-behaved side of the model and imply that qualitative behavior is determinate, dissipating indeterminacy concerns to the contrary (Krusell and Smith, 2003). We prove by construction that equilibria always exist and that multiplicity is present in some cases, highlighting that our robust predictions are not due to uniqueness. Similar results may be obtainable in related dynamic games, such as political economy models of public spending.
主题	Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24257
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581931
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dan Cao,Iván Werning. Saving and Dissaving with Hyperbolic Discounting. 2018.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w24257.pdf（455KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览