| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24273 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24273 |
| Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Party Tariff Negotiations | |
| Kyle Bagwell; Robert W. Staiger; Ali Yurukoglu | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a model of international tariff negotiations to study the design of the institutional rules of the GATT/WTO. We embed a multi-sector model of trade between multiple countries into a model of inter-connected bilateral negotiations over tariffs. Using 1990 trade flows and tariff outcomes from the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations, we estimate country-sector productivity levels, sector-level productivity dispersion, iceberg trade costs, and country-pair bargaining parameters. We use the estimated model to simulate an alternative institutional setting for multilateral tariff negotiations in which the most-favored-nation requirement is abandoned. We find that abandonment of the most-favored-nation requirement would result in inefficient over-liberalization of tariffs and a deterioration in world-wide welfare relative to the negotiated outcomes in the presence of the most-favored-nation requirement. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24273 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581947 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kyle Bagwell,Robert W. Staiger,Ali Yurukoglu. Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Party Tariff Negotiations. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24273.pdf（479KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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