全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24279
来源ID	Working Paper 24279
	The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation
	Andrea Mattozzi; Erik Snowberg
发表日期	2018-02-05
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24279
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581952
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andrea Mattozzi,Erik Snowberg. The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation. 2018.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w24279.pdf（544KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览