| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24343 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24343 |
| Promotions and the Peter Principle | |
| Alan Benson; Danielle Li; Kelly Shue | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in her current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 214 firms, we find evidence consistent with the “Peter Principle,” which predicts that firms prioritize current job performance in promotion decisions at the expense of other observable characteristics that better predict managerial performance. We estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high, suggesting either that firms are making inefficient promotion decisions or that the benefits of promotion-based incentives are great enough to justify the costs of managerial mismatch. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24343 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582016 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan Benson,Danielle Li,Kelly Shue. Promotions and the Peter Principle. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24343.pdf（374KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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