| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24350 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24350 |
| Waiting for the Payday? The Market for Startups and the Timing of Entrepreneurial Exit | |
| Ashish Arora; Andrea Fosfuri; Thomas Roende | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most technology startups are set up for exit through acquisition by large corporations. In choosing when to sell, startups face a tradeoff. Early acquisition reduces execution errors but later acquisition improves the likelihood of finding a better match since in the early market, there are fewer buyers because early acquisition requires costly absorptive capacity. Moreover, the buyer’s decision to invest in absorptive capacity is related to the startup’s decision about the timing of the exit sale. In this paper, we build a model to capture this complexity and the related tradeoffs. We find that the early market for startups is inefficiently thin if the timing of exit is a strategic choice, i.e. startups have to commit to whether to exit early or late. Too few startups are sold early, and too few buyers invest in absorptive capacity. Paradoxically, venture capital aggravates the inefficiency. However, if the timing of exit is a tactical choice, i.e. startups can choose to go late after observing the early offers, there are too many early acquisitions and too much investment in absorptive capacity by incumbents |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24350 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582023 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ashish Arora,Andrea Fosfuri,Thomas Roende. Waiting for the Payday? The Market for Startups and the Timing of Entrepreneurial Exit. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24350.pdf（1202KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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