| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24354 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24354 |
| Industry Input in Policymaking: Evidence from Medicare | |
| David C. Chan, Jr; Michael J. Dickstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In setting prices for physician services, Medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry. We investigate whether this arrangement leads to prices biased toward the interests of committee members. We find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10%, demonstrating a pathway for regulatory capture. We then evaluate the effect of affiliation on the quality of information used in price-setting. More affiliated proposals produce less hard information, measured as lower quality survey data. However, affiliation results in prices that are more closely followed by private insurers, suggesting that affiliation may increase the total information used in price-setting. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24354 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582026 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David C. Chan, Jr,Michael J. Dickstein. Industry Input in Policymaking: Evidence from Medicare. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24354.pdf（537KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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