G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w24354
来源IDWorking Paper 24354
Industry Input in Policymaking: Evidence from Medicare
David C. Chan, Jr; Michael J. Dickstein
发表日期2018-02-26
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要In setting prices for physician services, Medicare solicits input from a committee that evaluates proposals from industry. We investigate whether this arrangement leads to prices biased toward the interests of committee members. We find that increasing a measure of affiliation between the committee and proposers by one standard deviation increases prices by 10%, demonstrating a pathway for regulatory capture. We then evaluate the effect of affiliation on the quality of information used in price-setting. More affiliated proposals produce less hard information, measured as lower quality survey data. However, affiliation results in prices that are more closely followed by private insurers, suggesting that affiliation may increase the total information used in price-setting.
主题Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w24354
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582026
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
David C. Chan, Jr,Michael J. Dickstein. Industry Input in Policymaking: Evidence from Medicare. 2018.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w24354.pdf(537KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[David C. Chan, Jr]的文章
[Michael J. Dickstein]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[David C. Chan, Jr]的文章
[Michael J. Dickstein]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[David C. Chan, Jr]的文章
[Michael J. Dickstein]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w24354.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。