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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w24366 |
来源ID | Working Paper 24366 |
Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts | |
Niels Johannesen; Patrick Langetieg; Daniel Reck; Max Risch; Joel Slemrod | |
发表日期 | 2018-03-05 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of the enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. Enforcement caused approximately 60,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of around $120 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. The disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries whose institutions facilitate tax evasion. The enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2.5-$4 billion corresponding to $0.7-$1.0 billion in additional tax revenue. |
主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24366 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582039 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Niels Johannesen,Patrick Langetieg,Daniel Reck,et al. Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w24366.pdf(2234KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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