| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24383 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24383 |
| Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings | |
| Adnan Q. Khan; Asim Ijaz Khwaja; Benjamin A. Olken | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-12 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30-41 percent. Inspectors that our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24383 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582057 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adnan Q. Khan,Asim Ijaz Khwaja,Benjamin A. Olken. Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24383.pdf（619KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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