| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24413 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24413 |
| A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions | |
| Laurent Bouton; Micael Castanheira; Allan Drazen | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a theory of small campaign contributions driven by an electoral motive, i.e., the desire to influence election outcomes. Though small donors take as given the actions of others, strategic interactions induce patterns consistent with empirical findings, e.g., election closeness and underdog effects. We also study different forms of campaign finance laws, and show why caps should be combined with a progressive tax on contributions. Next, we introduce large donors and show that several conclusions in the literature may be significantly modified by the interaction with small donors. Throughout, we discuss the empirical implications of our findings. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24413 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582087 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Micael Castanheira,Allan Drazen. A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24413.pdf（485KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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