| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24427 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24427 |
| Fast-Track Authority: A Hold-Up Interpretation. | |
| Levent Celik; Bilgehan Karabay; John McLaren | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central institution of US trade policy is Fast-Track Authority (FT), by which Congress commits not to amend a trade agreement that is presented to it for ratification, but to subject the agreement to an up-or-down vote. We offer a new interpretation of FT based on a hold-up problem. If the US government negotiates a trade agreement with the government of a smaller economy, as the negotiations proceed, businesses in the partner economy, anticipating the opening of the US market to their goods, may make sunk investments to take advantage of the US market, such as quality upgrades to meet the expectations of the demanding US consumer. As a result, when the time comes for ratification of the agreement, the partner economy will be locked in to the US market in a way it was not previously. At this point, if Congress is able to amend the agreement, the partner country has less bargaining power than it did ex ante, and so Congress can make changes that are adverse to the partner. As a result, if the US wants to convince such a partner country to negotiate a trade deal, it must first commit not to amend the agreement ex post. In this situation, FT is Pareto-improving. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24427 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582101 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Levent Celik,Bilgehan Karabay,John McLaren. Fast-Track Authority: A Hold-Up Interpretation.. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24427.pdf（669KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
