| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24445 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24445 |
| Saving Lives by Tying Hands: The Unexpected Effects of Constraining Health Care Providers | |
| Jonathan Gruber; Thomas P. Hoe; George Stoye | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-26 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The emergency department (ED) is a complex node of healthcare delivery that is facing market and regulatory pressure across developed economies to reduce wait times. In this paper we study how ED doctors respond to such incentives, by focussing on a landmark policy in England that imposed strong incentives to treat ED patients within four hours. Using bunching techniques, we estimate that the policy reduced affected patients’ wait times by 19 minutes, yet distorted a number of medical decisions. In response to the policy, doctors increased the intensity of ED treatment and admitted more patients for costly inpatient care. We also find a striking 14% reduction in mortality. To determine the mechanism behind these health improvements, we exploit heterogeneity in patient severity and hospital crowding, and find strongly suggestive evidence that it is the reduced wait times, rather than the additional admits, that saves lives. Overall we conclude that, despite distorting medical decisions, constraining ED doctors can induce cost-effective reductions in mortality. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24445 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582118 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Gruber,Thomas P. Hoe,George Stoye. Saving Lives by Tying Hands: The Unexpected Effects of Constraining Health Care Providers. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24445.pdf（580KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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