| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24457 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24457 |
| The Revealed Preference of the Chinese Communist Party Leadership: Investing in Local Economic Development versus Rewarding Social Connections | |
| Matthew E. Kahn; Weizeng Sun; Jianfeng Wu; Siqi Zheng | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Over the last 30 years, the Chinese government has invested in new industrial parks with the intent of stimulating urban economic growth. The central government delegates the site selection decision to provincial leaders. A principal-agent issue arises because the central government prioritizes efficiency and equity criteria while the provincial leader may allocate such place based investments to reward socially connected mayors. We present a revealed preference test of industrial park site selection and document the willingness of China’s provincial leaders to sacrifice economic development in order to reward social connections. We examine the causes and consequences of this misallocation of capital. |
| 主题 | Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24457 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582131 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew E. Kahn,Weizeng Sun,Jianfeng Wu,et al. The Revealed Preference of the Chinese Communist Party Leadership: Investing in Local Economic Development versus Rewarding Social Connections. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24457.pdf（571KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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