| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24460 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24460 |
| Bank Examiners\u2019 Information and Expertise and Their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893 | |
| Charles W. Calomiris; Mark Carlson | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine whether examiners were informed and contributed to the health of the banking sector. Information included quantitative information that was eventually made public, quantitative information that remained private, and subjective information dependent on the examiner’s production of additional, “soft” information that informed examiner assessments of the quality of bank assets and management. All three types of information were useful for gauging the condition of the bank, and affected bank behavior, including a publicly observable signal (skipping a dividend payment). Participants in the market for bank liabilities reacted to this signal in ways that promoted market discipline. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; History ; Financial History ; Other History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24460 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582134 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles W. Calomiris,Mark Carlson. Bank Examiners\u2019 Information and Expertise and Their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24460.pdf（425KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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