| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24481 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24481 |
| Coordinating Separate Markets for Externalities | |
| Jose-Miguel Abito; Christopher R. Knittel; Konstantinos Metaxoglou; André Trindade | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-09 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that inefficiencies from having separate markets to correct an environmental externality are significantly mitigated when firms participate in an integrated product market. Firms take into account the distribution of externality prices and reallocate output from markets with high prices to markets with low prices. Investment in cleaner and more efficient capacity serves as an additional mechanism to reallocate output, which increases the marginal benefit of investment, and consequently improves longer-term outcomes. Using data from an integrated wholesale electricity market, we estimate a dynamic structural model of production and investment to bound the loss from separate markets for carbon dioxide emissions, and quantify the extent to which optimal investment can compensate for the loss. Despite the lack of the “invisible hand” of a single emissions market, profit-maximizing firms can play a crucial role in coordinating otherwise uncoordinated environmental regulations. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24481 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582155 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jose-Miguel Abito,Christopher R. Knittel,Konstantinos Metaxoglou,et al. Coordinating Separate Markets for Externalities. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24481.pdf（920KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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