全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24496
来源ID	Working Paper 24496
	Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules
	Marina Halac; Pierre Yared
发表日期	2018-04-09
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a simple model to study rules based on instruments vs. targets. A principal faces a better informed but biased agent and relies on joint punishments as incentives. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the agent's observable action; target-based rules condition incentives on outcomes that depend on the agent's action and private information. In each class, an optimal rule takes a threshold form and imposes the worst punishment upon violation. Target-based rules dominate instrument-based rules if and only if the agent's information is sufficiently precise. An optimal unconstrained rule relaxes the instrument threshold whenever the target threshold is satisfied.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24496
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582170
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules. 2018.