| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24517 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24517 |
| Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates | |
| Ramana Nanda; Matthew Rhodes-Kropf | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-16 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has largely abstracted away from the fact that a startup typically does not have just one investor, but several VCs that come together in a syndicate to finance a venture. In this chapter, we therefore argue for an expansion of the standard perspective to also include frictions within VC syndicates. Put differently, what are the frictions that arise from the fact that there is not just one investor for each venture, but several investors with different incentives, objectives and cash flow rights, who nevertheless need to collaborate to help make the venture a success? We outline the ways in which these coordination frictions manifest themselves, describe the underlying drivers and document several contractual solutions used by VCs to mitigate their effects. We believe that this broader perspective provides several promising avenues for future research. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24517 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582190 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ramana Nanda,Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24517.pdf（435KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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