| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24579 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24579 |
| Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense | |
| Amanda Agan; Matthew Freedman; Emily Owens | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-07 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained. The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24579 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582252 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Amanda Agan,Matthew Freedman,Emily Owens. Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24579.pdf（287KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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