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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w24588
来源IDWorking Paper 24588
Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives
Caterina Calsamglia; Chao Fu; Maia Güell
发表日期2018-05-14
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros.
主题Health, Education, and Welfare ; Labor Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w24588
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582262
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Caterina Calsamglia,Chao Fu,Maia Güell. Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives. 2018.
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