| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24589 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24589 |
| Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance | |
| Christopher Martin; Manju Puri; Alexander Ufier | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-14 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using unique, daily, account-level balances data we investigate deposit stability and the drivers of deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors from the bank following bad regulatory news. We find that government deposit guarantees, both regular deposit insurance and temporary deposit insurance measures, reduce the outflow of deposits. We also characterize which accounts are more stable (e.g., checking accounts and older accounts). We further provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with the run-off, gross funding inflows are large and of first-order impact — a result which is missed when looking at aggregated deposit data alone. Losses of uninsured deposits were largely offset with new insured deposits as the bank approached failure. We show our results hold more generally using a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action. Our results raise questions about depositor discipline, widely considered to be one of the key pillars of financial stability, raising the importance of other mechanisms of restricting bank risk taking, including prudent supervision. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24589 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582263 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Martin,Manju Puri,Alexander Ufier. Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24589.pdf（736KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
