| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24604 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24604 |
| The Carbon Abatement Game | |
| Christoph Hambel; Holger Kraft; Eduardo S. Schwartz | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-21 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Climate change is one of the major global challenges. Mitigating its impact is however bedeviled by free-rider problems and external effects. We thus study the problem of optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic non-cooperative game-theoretical setting involving multiple countries that are open economies. Our framework involves stochastic dynamics for CO2 emissions and economic output of the countries. Each country is represented by a recursive-preference functional. Despite its complexity, the model is analytically tractable. We can explicitly quantify each country's decision on consumption, investment, and abatement expenditures. We also derive closed-form solutions for the country-specific and global social cost of carbon (SCC). One key finding is that both versions of the SCC are increasing in trade volume. This result is robust to adding capital transfers between countries. Our numerical examples suggest that disregarding trade might lead to a significant underestimation of the SCC. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24604 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582278 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christoph Hambel,Holger Kraft,Eduardo S. Schwartz. The Carbon Abatement Game. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24604.pdf（748KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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