| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w24627
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24627
|
| Noisy Agents |
| Francisco Espinosa; Debraj Ray
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-21
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Agents signal their type in a principal-agent model; the principal seeks to retain good agents. Types are signaled with some ambient noise. Agents can choose to add or remove additional noise at a cost. It is shown that monotone retention strategies, in which the principal keeps the agent if the signal crosses some threshold, are generically never equilibria. The main result identifies an equilibrium with a bounded retention zone, in which the principal is wary of both excessively good and excessively bad signals: she retains the agent if the signal is “moderate” and replaces him otherwise. The equilibria we uncover are robust to various extensions: non-normal signal structures, non-binary types, interacting agents, costly mean-shifting, or dynamics with term limits. We discuss applications to risky portfolio management, fake news and noisy government statistics. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
; Economics of Information
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24627
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582301
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Francisco Espinosa,Debraj Ray. Noisy Agents. 2018.
|
|
文件名：
|
w24627.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
