| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24638 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24638 |
| From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners | |
| Haris Tabakovic; Thomas G. Wollmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-05-28 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many regulatory agency employees are hired by the firms they regulate, creating a “revolving door” between government and the private sector. We study these transitions using detailed data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. We find that patent examiners grant significantly more patents to the firms that later hire them and that much of this leniency extends to prospective employers. These effects are strongest in years when firms are actively hiring, and these relationships hold for the intensive margin of intellectual property protection. Ultimately, this leads the agency to issue lower quality patents, which we measure in citations. Together with other supporting evidence, we argue these results are suggestive of regulatory capture. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24638 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582312 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Haris Tabakovic,Thomas G. Wollmann. From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24638.pdf（314KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
