| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24668 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24668 |
| Insurance without Commitment: Evidence from the ACA Marketplaces | |
| Rebecca Diamond; Michael J. Dickstein; Timothy McQuade; Petra Persson | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-04 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the dynamics of participation and health care consumption in the Affordable Care Act’s health insurance marketplaces. Unlike other health insurance contexts, we find individuals commonly drop coverage midyear–roughly 30% of enrollees exit within nine months of sign-up. While covered, dropouts spend more on health care than in the months before sign-up or after exit. We model the consequences of drop-out on equilibrium premiums and consumer welfare. While dropouts generate a type of adverse selection, the welfare effect from their participation is ambiguous and depends on the relative costs per month of part-year vs. full-year enrollees. In our empirical setting, we find that imposing a penalty that incentivizes participation for at least 3.5 months would lower premium levels and improve overall consumer welfare. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24668 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582341 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rebecca Diamond,Michael J. Dickstein,Timothy McQuade,et al. Insurance without Commitment: Evidence from the ACA Marketplaces. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24668.pdf（1647KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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