全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24672
来源ID	Working Paper 24672
	Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value
	Briana Chang; Harrison Hong
发表日期	2018-06-04
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more from talented CEOs. Using assignment models, we show that the importance of talent (or agent heterogeneity) relative to selection (or firm heterogeneity) is measured by wage increases across agents of different compensation ranks divided by changes in output across their firms. The median of this ratio is 0.5% for underwriters and 2% for CEOs.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24672
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582345
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Briana Chang,Harrison Hong. Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value. 2018.