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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w24672 |
来源ID | Working Paper 24672 |
Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value | |
Briana Chang; Harrison Hong | |
发表日期 | 2018-06-04 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more from talented CEOs. Using assignment models, we show that the importance of talent (or agent heterogeneity) relative to selection (or firm heterogeneity) is measured by wage increases across agents of different compensation ranks divided by changes in output across their firms. The median of this ratio is 0.5% for underwriters and 2% for CEOs. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24672 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582345 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Briana Chang,Harrison Hong. Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value. 2018. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w24672.pdf(574KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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