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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w24672
来源IDWorking Paper 24672
Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value
Briana Chang; Harrison Hong
发表日期2018-06-04
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more from talented CEOs. Using assignment models, we show that the importance of talent (or agent heterogeneity) relative to selection (or firm heterogeneity) is measured by wage increases across agents of different compensation ranks divided by changes in output across their firms. The median of this ratio is 0.5% for underwriters and 2% for CEOs.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w24672
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582345
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GB/T 7714
Briana Chang,Harrison Hong. Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value. 2018.
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