| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24675 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24675 |
| Complex Disclosure | |
| Ginger Zhe Jin; Michael Luca; Daniel J. Martin | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present evidence that unnecessarily complex disclosure can result from strategic incentives to shroud information. In our lab experiment, senders are required to report their private information truthfully, but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find that senders use complex disclosure over half the time. This obfuscation is profitable because receivers make systematic mistakes in assessing complex reports. Regression and structural analysis suggest that these mistakes could be driven by receivers who are naive about the strategic use of complexity or overconfident about their ability to process complex information. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24675 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582348 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ginger Zhe Jin,Michael Luca,Daniel J. Martin. Complex Disclosure. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24675.pdf（590KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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