| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24679 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24679 |
| When Less is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India's Demonetization | |
| Abhijit Banerjee; Emily Breza; Arun G. Chandrasekhar; Benjamin Golub | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How should policymakers disseminate information: by broadcasting it widely (e.g., via mass media), or letting word spread from a small number of initially informed “seed” individuals? While conventional wisdom suggests delivering information more widely is better, we show theoretically and experimentally that this may not hold when people need to ask questions to fully comprehend the information they were given. In a field experiment during the chaotic 2016 Indian demonetization, we varied how information about demonetization’s official rules was delivered to villages on two dimensions: how many were initially informed (broadcasting versus seeding) and whether the identity of the initially informed was publicly disclosed (common knowledge). The quality of information aggregation is measured in three ways: the volume of conversations about demonetization, the level of knowledge about demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized decision dependent on understanding the rules. Our results are consistent with four predictions of a model in which people need others’ help to make the best use of announced information, but worry about signaling inability or unwillingness to correctly process the information they have access to. First, if who is informed is not publicized, broadcasting improves all three outcomes relative to seeding. Second, under seeding, publicizing who is informed improves all three outcomes. Third, when broadcasting, publicizing who is informed hurts along all three dimensions. Finally, when who is informed is made public, telling more individuals (broadcasting relative to seeding) is worse along all three dimensions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Behavioral Finance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24679 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582352 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Abhijit Banerjee,Emily Breza,Arun G. Chandrasekhar,et al. When Less is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India's Demonetization. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24679.pdf（7454KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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