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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w24682 |
来源ID | Working Paper 24682 |
Reputation and Sovereign Default | |
Manuel Amador; Christopher Phelan | |
发表日期 | 2018-06-11 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper presents a continuous-time model of sovereign debt. In it, a relatively impatient sovereign government's hidden type switches back and forth between a commitment type, which cannot default, and an optimizing type, which can default at any time, and assume outside lenders have particular beliefs regarding how a commitment type should borrow for any given level of debt and bond price. If these beliefs satisfy reasonable assumptions, in any Markov equilibrium, the optimizing type mimics the commitment type when borrowing, revealing its type only by defaulting on its debt at random times. Further, in such Markov equilibria (the solution to a simple pair of ordinary differential equations), there are positive gross issuances at all dates, constant net imports as long as there is a positive equilibrium probability that the government is the optimizing type, and net debt repayment only by the commitment type. For countries that have recently defaulted, the interest rate the country pays on its debt is a decreasing function of the amount of time since its last default, and its total debt is an increasing function of the amount of time since its last default. For countries that have not recently defaulted, interest rates are constant. |
主题 | International Economics ; International Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24682 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582355 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Amador,Christopher Phelan. Reputation and Sovereign Default. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w24682.pdf(743KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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