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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w24700 |
来源ID | Working Paper 24700 |
How European Markets Became Free: A Study of Institutional Drift | |
Germán Gutiérrez; Thomas Philippon | |
发表日期 | 2018-06-11 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Over the past twenty years, Europe has deregulated many industries, protected consumer welfare, and created strongly independent regulators. These policies represent a stark departure from historical traditions in continental Europe. How and why did this turnaround happen? We build a political economy model of market regulation and we compare the design of national and supra-national regulators. We show that countries in a single market willingly promote a supranational regulator that enforces free markets beyond the preferences of any individual country. We test and confirm the predictions of the model. European institutions are indeed more independent and enforce competition more strongly than any individual country ever did. Countries with ex-ante weaker institutions benefit more from the delegation of competition policy to the EU level. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24700 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582372 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Germán Gutiérrez,Thomas Philippon. How European Markets Became Free: A Study of Institutional Drift. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w24700.pdf(926KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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